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NARRATIVE STEP 
The current financial and environmental crises call for an open view on the measures available for 
approaching a degrowth economy, including lower production, work sharing, low birth rates, and 
more equity, nationally as well as globally. Financial policies must adapt to these developments, 
allowing for degrowth ‘without tears’.  
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SUMMARY 
When analyzing environmental problems, it is useful to apply the following simple equation for the 
environmental impact ‘I’, (here representing energy consumption): 
I = P·A·T, 
With ‘P’ representing population, ‘A’ affluence per capita, and ‘T’ resource intensity, i.e. energy per 
affluence unit ‘A’. All three factors are through the equation coupled to ‘I’, and in general we should 
avoid using the misleading terminology of decoupling environmental impact (energy consumption) 
from the economy, represented by ‘P·A’. So far essentially all policies towards lowering ‘I’ has been 
devoted towards technical increase in energy efficiency, i.e., lowering ‘T’.  The relief thereby obtained  
on ‘I’, however, tends to be rebounded by increasing both ‘P’ and ‘A’, which pull ‘I’ upwards.   
In a future degrowth economy, aiming at reducing ‘I’ significantly, focusing only on ‘T’ will not suffice. 
We must also reduce, or at least limit, ‘P’ and ‘A’, including their rebound growth from the ‘T’ 
decrease. The paper suggest this to be achievable in affluent countries, by letting ‘P’ decline through 
low birth rates, and encouraging ‘A’ to decline in exchange for lowering labor input to the economy, 
partly as shorter work time, and/or more satisfactory work conditions. A rather painless way to 
reduce ‘A’ can be to gradually extend the life time of durable goods, i.e. slowing down their repetitive 
replacement. The measures are in line with some trends in public preferences in Western Europe, but 
totally incompatible with the prevailing financial growth policy pursued by most governments.  
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INTRODUCTION 
As a starting point for analyzing the environmental impact and the options for mitigating it, it is useful 
to remember the following simple equation for the impact ‘I’,  
I = P·A·T, 
developed by Erlich and Holdren (1971). To make this paper more clear and manageable ‘I’ is here 
simplified to represent not all environmental impacts, but in general just energy consumption.  ‘P’ 
stands for population, ‘A’ for affluence per capita, and ‘T’ for environmental impact intensity, i.e. in 
this case energy consumption per affluence ‘A’.  This simple equation represents a stationary case, 
where the three right side factors are assumed independent of each other. So far essentially all 
political efforts towards lowering ‘I’ has been devoted towards increasing energy efficiency, i.e., 
lowering ‘T’. This reduction has, however, through the Rebound Effect, enabled and tempted people 
economically, sociologically, and psychologically to increase both ‘P’ and ‘A’, and hence the general 
economy, which pulls ‘I’ upwards and thereby eat up some of – or all - the ‘I’ gains from lowering ‘T’. 
This rebound effect exposes that the right side factors in this simple equation are interdependent, so 
more correctly the equation should be written as I = f(P,A,T), (Alcott, 2010). This makes the equation 
more general, but still also valuable as a memo.  
For affluent economies aiming at significant degrowth in ‘I’, it is not sufficient to lower only ‘T’. 
Measures to reduce or at least confine ’P’ and ‘A’ should also be in play, including their rebound from 
‘T’ reduction. Such measures seem to be achievable and acceptable by the majority of people in 
affluent countries, where voluntary low birth rates point towards declining population, ‘P’, and where 
surveys often indicate public preferences for more relaxed work patterns over more income and 
consumption, i.e. lower ‘A’. These trends are, however, counteracted in present growth guided 
economic policy. But in a society aiming at degrowth, such options for lowering, or at least stabilizing, 
‘P’ and ‘A’ should obviously be encouraged. This could also ‘release’ a substantial potential for 
indirectly reduction of ‘I’, through longevity and sharing of durable goods. These options have been 
shelved or ‘frozen’ during the present consumerism and economic growth structure.  
 
THE DELUSION OF DECOUPLING 
The notion of decoupling economic activities from energy consumption (environmental impact) has 
often been used to describe a situation where the two parameters do not grow at the same rate, 
usually when ‘I’ is growing slower than the economy ‘P·A’. The fact is, however, that the economy and 
environmental impact probably never have ‘happened to’ grow at just the same rates, since the 
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economic structure develops over time. Linguistically decoupling implies no coupling at all, and since 
physically there seems to be no economic activity without an environmental impact (and the reverse), 
the commonly used term ‘decoupling’ does not make much sense, no matter whether called relative 
or absolute decoupling (Nørgård, 2009).  
This is not just a finicky discussion on terminology. The trouble is that the use of the term decoupling 
is distorting the debate, because it gives the public and politicians the false impression and even 
confidence, (often sub-consciously) that it is possible to have economic growth forever without any 
environmental impact. Numerous examples from real life statistics indicate clearly a coupling 
between economic activities and energy consumption, both when the economies go up and down.  
Instead of talking about a decoupling, a better aim for environmental progress is to accentuate 
declining eco-intensity, ‘T’, of the economy. But the most appropriate indicator to report on and aim 
for is a reduction in absolute environmental impacts ‘I’, since nature doesn’t care to give us any credit 
for the growth in our ‘P’ and ‘A’.  
 
POPULATION  FACTOR, A DECISIVE TABOO  
It is not by accident that ‘P’ for population is the first right side factor in the equation for 
environmental impact ‘I’, considering that we are talking about man made impact. At the time the 
equation was established in the late 1960s, population ‘P’ was the dominating factor in the 
environmental debate, and in the equation it was multiplied by per capita impact ‘F’ (Erlich and Erlich 
1972:260). Soon it was found appropriate to recognize the impact’s susceptibility to technological 
changes by splitting up ‘F’ into two, affluence ‘A’ times the impact intensity of the technology, ‘T’, 
applied to provide ‘A’. (Erlich and Holdren 1971).  
When later the environmental debate really came on the political agenda in the wealthy countries, 
population was fading away in the debate to now being close to a taboo, even by most 
environmentally dedicated NGO’s. Apparently, it has become too sensitive an issue, both privately 
and politically. When today population issues are debated in Europe, it is mostly because the low birth 
rates of around 1.6 children per woman are rightfully seen as a threat to the economic growth, (and 
hence a highly important issue in planning for degrowth !)  
In the previous centuries Europe had been facing overpopulation, but it was ‘solved’ by millions of 
Europeans emigrating overseas, taking control of around four quite ‘empty’ continents: North 
America, South America, Australia and parts of Africa and Asia. This development has a scaring 
parallel today in the outlook for the world as a whole, illustrated by the ecological footprint, ‘I’. Today 
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the World is overpopulated in the sense that the population’s environmental impact ‘I’ is exceeding 
the capacity of the Earth by 50% (Global Footprint Network 2014). There are, however, no more 
empty continents to emigrate to. Unless the world society is drastically and fast reducing its impact, 
‘I’, the world’s total environmental deficit will soon amount to a couple of empty planets to 
supplement the beautiful, but crowded Earth. The situation calls for courageous steps to seriously 
include also the population factor ‘P’ in the environmental politic.   
China has through its drastic population policy since 1970s implemented the world’s most successful 
environmental project by lowering birth rates, sparing next generation for environmental impact of 
about half a billion people, while through a kind of rebound effect, enabled those Chinese born to 
enjoy a decent life. Many other Asian countries have in recent decades followed suit and achieved 
remarkable progresses in lowering birth rates from around 6 to 2, even with softer measures than 
China’s.  
Today dense populated Europe is on the right track with low birth rates, about 1.6 children born per 
woman, which can soon relieve Europe’s environmental pressure through a gentle decline in 
population. If from now on this became the worldwide birth rate, global population would in 150 
years be reduced to only half the present (Population Council 1998). Except for some temporary and 
manageable transition problems of distribution, it is hard to see any global problems, which would 
not be a lot easier to solve with only half as many people. 
Despite such positive trend in many regions, World population is still growing (though today not 
exponentially, but rather linear) by around 80 million per year, due to the dynamic of age distribution, 
etc. This implies that if these newcomers should live on European standard, an extra equivalent to 
Germany would have to be established every year.  
Because population growth today is highest in poor countries, there is now a pressure towards 
reversing the earlier migration out of Europe, which was driven by shortage of land and resources. But 
today’s emigrants towards Europe will not, as did earlier outbound Europeans, find an ‘empty’ 
continent, with abundance of physical resources. Rather will they come to a relatively resource poor 
and dense populated Europe. These immigrants are attracted by the physical wealth built up in 
Europe by financial, social and technological capacities adding value to the natural resources, often 
imported from immigrant’s home regions. A policy towards equalizing the living standard in the world 
could be to move population from poor countries to more wealthy countries and/or to move the 
financial and technological capacities the other way.   
 
THE BASIC POLICY CONFLICT 
6 
 
Recognizing the above mentioned rebound effect from reducing ‘T’ should not lead to the conclusion 
that increasing resource efficiency, i. e. lowering ‘T’, is a problem per se and should be abandoned. 
Improving technological resource efficiency is, and should be, part of the solution. But it should be 
only part of the solution and always implemented in coherence with mitigating the other two factors, 
‘P’ and ‘A’.  
The real problem appears in the basic conflict between an economic growth policy encouraging 
increases in the ‘P’ and ‘A’ factors of the equation, and an environmental policy aimed at reducing ‘I’. 
Combining the two is often suggested in a policy, termed ‘green growth’. Such policy, however, stands 
and falls with a technological reduction rate in energy intensity, ‘T’, which is forever outbalancing the 
economic growth rate. If for instance, a conventionally anticipated growth in GDP (or ‘P·A’) of 3-4% 
should be combined with an environmental target of reducing the environmental impact ‘I’ to one 
tenth of present, as suggested for the affluent countries (Schmidt-Bleek 2001) this would within a few 
decades require an eco-efficiency around 100 times higher than present, i.e. an eco-intensity ‘T’ of 
only around one per cent of todays’ (Nørgård, 2009; Jackson 2009).  
It seems shortsighted to count on such technological fixes alone do the job, but politicians and 
business people have become so conceited by the modest environmental progress achieved by 
technology over the past 50 years, that they seem blind for including the easier and anyway necessary 
options of a coherent effort in dealing with ‘P’, ‘A’, and ‘T’.   
 
INDIRECT IMPACT FROM DURABLE GOODS 
People’s material affluence ‘A’ can be divided into 1) flows of non-durable goods, defined as 
consumption of goods the value of which lies in actually being consumed, such as food, water, 
electricity, heat etc., and 2) stocks of durable goods, defined as the physical goods, e.g. houses, 
clothes, and cars, the basic physical value of which lies in having a stock of them at disposal (Nørgård 
2006). These concepts and the following considerations can be applied not only to private 
consumption, but to the economy as a whole.  
Most awareness on energy saving options has been devoted to the non-durable flow of direct energy 
used for providing services like transport, light, comfort, meals, etc. by operating energy consuming 
durables like cars, lamps, houses, refrigerators, TVs, etc.  
However, investigating also indirect energy consumption, defined as the energy used to produce the 
durable goods, opens up for much more reduction in ‘I’, involving ‘A’ and ‘T’. The potentials for these 
savings lies in 1) improving energy efficiency in producing the durables, 2) reducing the number of 
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durable goods people purchase to have at disposal, e.g. by more sharing of the goods (cars, houses, 
clothes etc.), and finally 3) by extending the useful lifetime, i.e. the time in which the product is 
providing the physical service it was intended for, before being scrapped. In the following focus is on 
the latter.  
The useful lifetime of durable goods is determined by the following factors (Nørgård 1979):  
1) Technological obsolescence (durability), expressing the situation where the products are 
physically worn-down. This can be extended by making it easily repairable, etc. 
2) Functional obsolescence, as when new products can fulfill the purpose in a better way, 
including for instance by being more energy efficient.  
3) Psychological obsolescence, or out of fashion and novelty.  
Obviously, the first occurring obsolescence of a product determines the factual useful lifetime of the 
product. There is little meaning in extending 1), durability, if the product is discarded earlier because 
of 2) or 3). On the other hand, 1) durability sets the ultimate limit to longevity.     
Henry Ford, the pioneer in mass production of automobiles, stated in 1922 (Slade, 2006): “We want 
the man who buys one of our cars never to have to buy another.. “. This seems to reflect a sound view 
on a real economy, but after having dominated the market till the 1930s, Ford had to adapt to an 
obsolescence business strategy. This symbolizes what has ever since been a business dilemma 
between increasing people’s stock of durable goods – or – their flow of durable goods. The latter 
contributes most to GDP, and on a national scale the dilemma was manifested in 1933, when F.D. 
Roosevelt made a quick U-turn towards a growth policy, spurring public as well as private spending 
(see later). In this turmoil, part of the growth measures was the inclusion of the concept of planned 
obsolescence (London 1932), a business strategy of deliberately making the products obsolete faster 
in all the ways listed above, became part of this growth policy.  
 
REVERSING OBSOLESCENCE STRATEGY 
During the 1900s considerable knowledge in technology, marketing, financing, etc. has been 
accumulated, predominately applied towards boosting growth in GDP, including various forms of 
planned obsolescence as mentioned above. Switching towards pursuing a degrowth economy aimed 
at lowering energy consumption and environmental impacts ‘I’, we ought not to be surprised by 
finding a large backlog of options left behind. These include extension of longevity of goods as 
different as clothes, electronics, furniture, cars, houses, plastic items, etc.  
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Example 1. Electronics. Development of solid state components to replace vacuum tubes has made it 
technologically possible to build TVs, computers, and other electronic items, which can be designed 
with no moving part and serving its original purpose, probably for about a century. But the technology 
also made the production cheaper, and electronic businesses soon rebounded the components’ 
durability by moving into functional and psychological obsolescence business, urging or forcing people 
into replacing equipment every few months or years. But the knowledge of making them last for 
many decades is still available.  
Example 2. Clothes. More durable textile fibers can keep people warm and beautifully dressed for 
decades. But temptation from fashion changes leads to repetitive replacement every few months, so 
in real life not many clothes are worn out. (When looking at the different styles, which advertisement 
has convinced people to wear it seems like a very flexible obsolescence!).  
Example 3. Plastic is characterized by being a very durable material, but ironically much of it is used to 
produce disposable goods ranging from cameras to packaging, which because of its durability are 
ending up as very persistent waste, causing serious pollution problems at land as well as at sea.  
Let us assume that we dedicated aimed for a gradual decline in environmental impact ‘I’. In that case 
it would be ridiculous to ignore the ‘fallacies’ developed during our ‘buy and throw away’ culture, a 
culture with no role to play in a sustainable economy. We could then use the advertising experts to 
explain to consumers, little by little, the benefits of focusing more on the physical services provided by 
the car, the clothes, and the other durable goods, and less on fashions and novelty. Manufacturers 
could use their technical expertise to followed suit by designing more durable products with longer 
intervals between functional and fashion changes. This would put us on the track towards a target of 
extending the useful life time of durable goods to say four times present and hence to reduce the 
amount of indirect energy and other resources to produce these goods, which in some cases amounts 
to about half of all energy consumption -, to only a quarter of present.   
The main obstacle for beginning the path towards such indirect energy saving is not the technology, 
which is readily available, but the changes in economic and financial targets, including work pattern, 
see later.  There seems to be some public reaction against the throw away business towards 
preferring to keep and repair some of the durable goods.    
REDUCING REBOUND AFFLUENCE BY TAXING?  
Taxing resources, pollution, etc. or consumption in general (VAT) has been advocated – or even 
implemented – to mitigate environmental impact, including the rebound effect from lowering ‘T’. This 
would no doubt reduce people’s incentives to consume, but the question is where does the tax 
revenue go? One option for governments is to use some of the revenue to lower income taxes, but 
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this would leave people with more disposable income, which might then be spend on increasing 
normal, marginal consumption, including energy intensive activities. Another option is for the 
governments to spend the extra revenue on some environmentally benign activities. For a while this 
could be investment in energy saving technologies. Or the revenue could be spent on activities with 
low energy intensity like some social purposes with more care and less materials than average.  
The dilemma is here that when the tax economic revenues are spent productively, some output is 
inevitable, and like for all other affluences ‘A’, it will pull ‘I’ upwards, more or less. While there are 
many meaningful purposes in which to invest around the world, the obvious long term solution is to 
produce less, as illustrated below.  
Production is expressed by ‘A’ = f(L, R), where L is the total labor input into the formal economy, and R 
represents the use of nature’s resources. Production factor equations often also include capital, 
which, however, can be considered as stored labor input, so in a long term perspective only labor and 
nature is required to generate ‘A’.  
A degrowth economy will require a declining ‘A’ = f(L,R).  To some extent the resources and labor can 
be mutually substituted as typically been the case during industrialization when human labor 
increasingly has been replaced by fossil fueled machinery. This historical trend can in some cases be 
reversed, increasing the use manpower to replace fossil fuels. But more important, the two are 
interdependent in a diabolic way, where a lot of energy resources are spend in production with the 
main purpose of generating work to keep people busy and employed. Degrowth production will call 
for reducing labor input.    
 
REDUCING LABOR INPUT IN PRODUCTION 
Labor, L, as a production factor in the professional or formal (money) economy can be split up into the 
following sub-factors: 
L = Population × Labor force fraction × Working time × Employment rate × Labor productivity.  
Lowering ‘L’ can be achieved by reconsidering five factors, all of which offer rewards such as more 
leisure and freedom as compensation for the loss of income and consumption: 
1) Reducing population in a country obviously has a double effect on the country’s ‘I’ , since it 
reduces consumers as well as worker. As discussed earlier, Europe is here on the right track 
with low birth rates of 1.6 children per woman, which point towards a soon declining 
population in Europe.  
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2) Reducing the fraction of the population engaged in the workforce. In some industrialized 
countries, around 80 % of women in the working age have joined the work force and thereby 
contributed to the high growth in the professional economy in the last half of the 20th century. 
Lower pension age and longer educations are possible measures to reduce work force fraction.  
3) Reducing average working time per year. Sharing the work more evenly could be achieved by 
lowering the average or standard work time per year. This was the philosophy behind the US- 
proposal on solving unemployment by cutting the over 40 hours’ work week to 30 hours, 
strongly advocated by F.D. Roosevelt during his presidential campaign (Hunnicutt 1988; Cross 
1993; Beder 2000, Nørgård 2013). After he took office as president in 1933, a 30 hours’ bill was 
passed by the Senate, but a few weeks’ later business people convinced Roosevelt to 
completely switch policy from sharing the work towards increasing work and consumption 
instead.  
4) Reducing employment rate (increasing unemployment rate). The usual way to adjust 
employment in Western societies is to hire or fire according to the need in the various 
businesses and public institutions. The threat of 10% unemployment is a more powerful tool 
for employers when negotiating with employees than is the ‘threat’ of the 10% lower work 
week and income, if eliminating unemployment by work sharing.  
5) Reducing productivity. This option might appear insane for mainstream economists or 
politicians, because the growth in labor productivity has since early industrialization been the 
main driver for the economic growth. Nevertheless there are examples of abandoning some 
potential productivity gains in return for better work conditions. Another way to achieve lower 
productivity is by moving some production in the very productive professional economy back 
to the amateur economy, defined as the activities driven voluntary by affection. People might 
decide to work less hours for money and spending the extra leisure time doing more what 
they really like to do, maybe with their family and friends, with cooking, repairing things, etc. 
This would usually be much less productive, but in return give a higher work satisfaction 
(Nørgård 2013).      
There are many indications in the affluent countries that some of the above options would be 
acceptable if offered and organized by the public.  
Increasing leisure time is often claimed to increase consumption, which immediately doesn’t make 
sense. If people choose more leisure instead of more consumption they won’t have both. The 
question is how the leisure in general is spent, and this might be regulated by tax policies.   
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CONCLUDING REMARKS     
It is a general, although not surprising, observation that many political measures required for aiming 
at a degrowth economy are opposite those prevailing in our mainstream growth economy. As an 
example in affluent countries, low birth rates are usually entering as a problem, contrary to the view 
from a degrowth perspective. Similarly, in our growth economies, projects are judged more by how 
many jobs and how much money circulation, GDP, they create, and less by how much human 
satisfaction or how little environmental impact they cause. 
It appears that in affluent countries, especially those with high equity, the general public seems to be 
more ready and receptive for the transition towards degrowth than are those engaged in the political 
and economic system. This shows up as a clear preference for less work over more consumption, a 
quite remarkable attitude in light of the massive efforts from commercial advertisements and from 
governments to convince people to increase their consumption. Furthermore, these satiation trends 
do not appear to be much guided by people’s environmental concerns, which should even add to this 
preference.  
Basic changes are needed in the economic structures for transition to a degrowth society. But rather 
than just waiting for a ‘perfect’ economic system to come about, it is important to look for leverage 
points, i. e. points in the system, where individuals, groups, local governments and companies can 
initiate and spur the transition, for instance by keeping consumption relatively low and pushing for 
lower work time in the professional economy.   
Abandoning growth in GDP as the guiding principal in affluent regions, will bring a substantial 
degrowth of environmental impact ‘I’ within reach without any real cost in the form of declining 
general well-being and  happiness, if economic and financial structures are adapted appropriately. 
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